

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:AF:RTIERNEY

APPROVED BY:AF:WESCHAUFLE,JR.

S/S-MR.SEBASTIAN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 296389

NODIS

FOR WISNER

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 296389 SENT DAR ES SALAAM DEC 06.

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 296389

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, RH

SUBJECT: RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
NYERERE

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO PRESIDENT NYERERE FROM THE
SECRETARY.

2. "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING SO GENEROUSLY OF YOUR TIME TO
RECEIVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY REINHARDT, WHO HAS REPORTED
TO ME IN DETAIL ON HIS MEETING WITH YOU OF A WEEK AGO.

SUCH EXCHANGES ARE ALWAYS MOST VALUABLE, BUT THEY ARE
INDEED VITAL IN MATTERS AS DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX AS THE

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INITIATIVES WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN WITH REGARD TO RHODESIA
AND NAMIBIA. AS ALWAYS, I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HONEST
AND INTELLECTUALLY INCISIVE REFLECTIONS OF AFRICAN VIEW-

POINTS.

3. "THERE ARE SEVERAL ASPECTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH REINHARDT UPON WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT, SINCE THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PROCESS THAT BEGAN WITH OUR FIRST CONVERSATION LAST APRIL.

4. "FIRST, WITH REGARD TO RHODESIA, I DO RECALL THE SKEPTICISM YOU VOICED INITIALLY AS TO WHETHER THE TIME WAS RIPE TO TACKLE SMITH AND THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. IN FACT, YOU QUOTED TO ME A SWAHILI PROVERB SOMETHING LIKE "HARAKA HARAKA HAINA BARAKA," IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, ABOUT HURRYING HAVING NO BLESSING. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU DEFINITELY ENCOURAGED ME TO BELIEVE THAT IF WE COULD GET SMITH TO AGREE TO THE ESSENTIALS OF THE CALLAGHAN PROPOSALS, THAT IS, TO MAJORITY RULE WITHIN TWO YEARS, THEN THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT; I BELIEVE YOU USED THE WORD "MIRACLE".

5. FROM THE OUTSET, THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET SMITH TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH AN ADVANCED COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. ALSO, I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE THREAT OF CONTINUED GUERRILLA WARFARE ALONE WOULD NOT HAVE DONE THE JOB, AS SMITH UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVED HE COULD COUNT ON SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT TO CONTINUE FIGHTING ON INDEFINITELY.

6. "THE STRATEGY WAS TO DRAW SMITH INTO NEGOTIATIONS BY CONVINCING HIM THAT REASONABLE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE AND THAT REFUSAL ON HIS PART TO NEGOTIATE ON THAT BASIS AND TO ACCEPT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD CAUSE ALL HOPE OF SUPPORT TO DRY UP. TO PUSH SMITH, OR SOUTH AFRICA FOR THAT MATTER, BEYOND THAT POINT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE. THE LEVERAGE SIMPLY DID NOT AND DOES NOT EXIST.

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7. "ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT CONCERNS THE TRANSFER OF POWER. IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO GET SMITH'S AGREEMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN TWO YEARS; WE WANTED TO PIN HIM DOWN TO A PROCESS THAT WOULD GUARANTEE THAT RESULT BY STARTING IMMEDIATELY. THE IDEA WAS TO GET HIM TO TRANSFER POWER TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN WHICH WHITES WOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE BUT COULD NOT DOMINATE--THAT WOULD REPLACE THE SMITH REGIME BUT GUARANTEE ORDERLY CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM DURING THE TRANSITION.

8. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THIS APPROACH AS DISCUSSED BY THE

FOUR US AND UK MISSIONS WHICH VISITED YOU BEFORE I CAME THE SECOND TIME. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE DISCUSSED THIS AT LENGTH ON SEPTEMBER 15 AND, WHILE YOU HAD DOUBTS, YOU WISHED ME LUCK. WHEN WE MET AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 21, I OUTLINED WHAT WE HAD TENTATIVELY ACHIEVED--AS WE STILL AWAIT SMITH'S FINAL ACCEPTANCE--INCLUDING HIS COMMITMENT

TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WITH A COUNCIL OF STATE WITH AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BLACKS AND WHITES, IN FAVOR OF WHICH THE SMITH REGIME'S CONSTITUTION WOULD BE SUSPENDED--AND YOU SAID THAT IT LOOKED FINE, THAT, FRANKLY, YOU THOUGHT I HAD DONE IT.

9. "NOW, YOU EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE--IN OTHER WORDS, THAT SMITH MUST BE RECKONED WITH LEST HE (AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS) BACK OUT OF THE WHOLE THING. THAT IS BECAUSE HE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE AND TRANSFER POWER TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT, FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THE WHITE MINORITY WOULD HAVE A SHARE; HE DID NOT AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL MAJORITY RULE.

10. "THUS WHEN WE SPEAK OF SMITH'S POWER, WE ARE SPEAKING OF THE POWER HE HOLDS NOW BUT HAS AGREED TO TRANSFER TO AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IF THE NATIONALISTS MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THEN THE WHOLE THING WILL BREAK DOWN, INCLUDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD HELP GET HIM TO ACCEPT IT.

11. "I CAN UNDERSTAND THE FEARS OF THE NATIONALISTS WHO
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DO NOT WANT TO LAY DOWN ARMS AND JOIN A GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THERE WAS EVEN A REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THE WHITE MINORITY COULD REGAIN THE UPPER HAND. ALL AGREE THAT THERE MUST BE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THIS. BUT THE NATIONALISTS DO NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT SMITH CANNOT DELIVER ON HIS COMMITMENT TO END HIS OWN REGIME WITHOUT A SIMILAR SAFEGUARD AGAINST A SUDDEN TERMINATION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND THE MEASURED, THOUGH INEXORABLE, PACE OF CHANGE THAT THEY SEE AS A GUARANTEE AGAINST CHAOS. WE DO NOT SUPPORT ALL ASPECTS OF THE FIVE POINTS. WE HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT THEY ARE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. BUT WE CANNOT TAKE LIGHTLY ABANDONING THE ENTIRE FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAS SO FAR EXISTED.

12. "I THOUGHT THE FRONTLINE STATES WERE AGREED ON THIS BASIC APPROACH, WHICH IS THE ONLY WORKABLE ONE. WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO CHANGE THIS UNDERSTANDING? WHY DO THEY NOW ENCOURAGE THE NATIONALISTS TO DEMAND THAT BRITAIN ASSUME OVERALL CONTROL THROUGH AN APPOINTED OFFICIAL WHO WOULD

BE CHOSEN PRIMARILY BY THE NATIONALISTS AND DISMISSED AT THEIR WILL?

13. "FACED WITH THESE KINDS OF DEMANDS, SMITH WILL MOST ASSUREDLY WRIGGLE OFF THE HOOK, FOR SUCH DEMANDS DIS-INTEGRATE THE BAIT THAT ENTICED AND HELD HIM THERE, NAMELY A TRANSITION DURING WHICH THE WHITES COULD ADJUST TO THE

CHANGES TAKING PLACE AND EITHER BE ASSURED OF THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY AND WELL BEING OR WITHDRAW.

14. "I NEED NOT REPEAT WHAT WE ALL RECOGNIZE AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE. I KNOW YOU DO NOT FEAR THE MEN WITH THE GUNS. NOR DO I. BUT CAN YOU CONTROL THE SOURCES THEY WILL TURN TO? THE ULTIMATE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE FAR WORSE THAN ANYONE IMAGINES -- ALL BECAUSE OF THE IMPATIENCE OF THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT TO WAIT THROUGH A RELATIVELY BRIEF TRANSITION WHICH IS CERTAINLY SHORTER THAN WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY FIGHTING.

15. "ON NAMIBIA, YOU SUGGEST THAT WE ASK WALDHEIM TO CALL A CONFERENCE AND THAT YOU CAN GET SAM NUJOMA TO COME.

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GIVEN THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE RUN INTO AT GENEVA, THIS IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I SENT YOU A MESSAGE IN EARLY OCTOBER OUTLINING THE ELEMENTS ON WHICH WE COULD GET SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AN IMPORTANT FURTHER CONCESSION THAT INSTEAD OF RECONVENING THE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, THE WINDHOEK CONFERENCE WOULD SEND ONLY A REPRESENTATIVE DELEGATION, THUS MAKING CLEAR THAT GENEVA WAS A DIFFERENT CONFERENCE.

16. "I EXPLAINED IN OCTOBER THAT FURTHER TIME SEEMED REQUIRED TO PERMIT ALL PARTIES TO CONSIDER THEIR POSITIONS AND THAT I WOULD TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL I RECEIVED FURTHER WORD ON HOW THE AFRICAN LEADERS WISHED TO PROCEED. SINCE NUJOMA HAS NEVER RESPONDED OTHER THAN TO RESTATE THE "PRECONDITIONS" HE POSITED IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, THERE IS NO AGREED BASIS UPON WHICH A CONFERENCE CAN BE CALLED. UNTIL THERE IS A CONSENSUS ON THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE STEPS, THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN GET SOUTH AFRICA TO MAKE PUBLIC ITS COMMITMENTS AND TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO GET IT STARTED.

17. "SINCE THERE IS LITTLE TIME LEFT FOR ME TO SEE THE PROCESS THROUGH, I AM ALL THE MORE DISAPPOINTED THAT WE COULD NOT GET NUJOMA'S COMMITMENT TO MOVE FORWARD. IF YOU BELIEVE YOU CAN GET SAM NUJOMA TO A CONFERENCE, PERHAPS YOU COULD GET HIM TO COME TALK WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT KAUNDA TO AGREE ON THE BASIC SUBSTANCE THAT WOULD HELP TO

GET THINGS GOING AGAIN RAPIDLY.

18. "LET ME ASSURE YOU I HAVE NOT GIVEN UP ON THE GREAT
ENDEAVOR WE STARTED TOGETHER. BUT IF THERE IS NO WAY YOU
CAN GET THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALISTS AND NUJOMA TO FACE UP TO
THE REALITIES OF HOW TO WIN WHAT THEY WANT THROUGH NEGOTIA-
TIONS, THEN I CANNOT HAVE MUCH OPTIMISM FOR THE OUTCOME.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER." END TEXT.KISSINGER
UNQUOTE ROBINSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 16 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INDEPENDENCE, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, SELFDETERMINATION, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE296389
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P840104-1877
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761293/baaaeqwa.tel
Line Count: 229
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14 MAY 2004 by woolflhd>; APPROVED <07 SEP 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, PSDC, RH, WA, TZ, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (NYERERE, JULIUS K)
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006